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Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER — PROUDHON

Vol. XII.—No. 1. NEW YORK, N. Y., MAY 16, 1896. Whole No. 339.

"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."
John Hay.

On Picket Duty.

To substantiate its assertion that Liberty "is a journal with some good qualities," despite the insufferable dulness of its editorial columns, "Paragraphs" points to the translations from Nietzsche, Shaw's review of Nordau, and a translation from Zola. The obvious inference from this is that, while the editor of Liberty is incapable of producing anything of value himself, he has the faculty of appreciating with some accuracy the products of others. Coming from "Paragraphs," this admission must have been an embarrassing one, and I can only admire the sacrifice of pride to truth by which alone it could have been made.

Comrade Byington is not the only one of my original opponents on the child question whose opinion was changed by the controversy over that subject. I am in receipt of a letter from Comrade Gilmour, of Glasgow, in which he says: "I must tell you—and feel no qualms of conscience in doing so—that I now agree with you *re* the care of children under Anarchism. I have been driven to the conclusion that mutual contract or a free fight are the real issues at stake between parents and a group or community. I intended to write something for Liberty, showing how I arrived at that conclusion; but, the fact is, I cannot get time."

The unprecedented rebuke administered to Goff by the New York court of appeals has delighted hundreds of justice-loving men. His charge in the Maria Barberi case is declared to have been objectionable and improper, because it was an animated argument for morality rather than an unbiassed review of the facts and the legal principles applicable to them. Maria Barberi will have a new trial, but Goff will not. The verdict against him will not be reversed. He is totally unfit for his judicial position, and the "moral" reformers who have elevated him must now see the fruit of hysterical crusades. I must add, however, that my mind harbors the suspicion that this reversal, just though it unquestionably is, might not have been handed down, had Goff been made recorder by one of the "machines" instead of by a party of rebels against the machines. The motive, I fear, is spite against Goff rather than justice to the accused. Goff is no worse than Gary (in intent perhaps better), but the higher court did not reverse Gary.

Bolton Hall tells the "Voice" that justice would solve the great majority of social problems and "make the rest so simple that an enlightened public sentiment," with leisure and energy to think, would speedily find solutions for it. Manifestly Mr. Hall has become convinced that history supports the view of libertarians. He himself points out now one of those classes of "facts" which he lately demanded that Liberty should furnish him with. "A saloon-keeper," he says, "in order to sell a drink, furnishes free lunch, hot suppers, a reading-room, and, practically, all the advantages of a club. I never found a man who sold milk doing that. It would not pay. Why not? Because competition has cut down prices on milk. Why has it not cut down the price of liquor? Because, notwithstanding the number engaged in the business, the business is a monopoly." Any man who has his eyes (and mind) open can find all around him lots of illustrations and proofs of the evil of monopoly—another word for invasion merely—and the remedial powers of liberty.

Liberty has little faith in congressional reports and investigations, but it hopes that the latest undertaking of Col. Carroll D. Wright will prove successful. He proposes to make the economy of municipal ownership of gas and electric light plants a subject for joint investigation by the national and State bureaus of labor statistics. Inasmuch as the mere difference in the price of lighting is often relied on by "municipalizationists" to prove the merit of governmental operation, the investigation will take account of all the elements that have been ignored. Full statistics will be given of the cost of plant, interest, wages, and cost of superintendence, as well as of the quality of the lighting furnished. The balance sheet, we are told, for public and private establishments, will indicate whether the public plants pay a real profit, make up a deficiency from taxation, or pay a nominal profit by ignoring the cost of plant and the bonded indebtedness incurred for its establishment. Such an investigation, if properly conducted, ought to throw some light on the municipalization. Liberty asks nothing better than to have the facts presented just as they are.

About the Size of It.

[Philadelphia Public Ledger.]

The compulsory education law passed by the last legislature is to be enforced, and from the standpoint of a politician it is a first-class law. It will divert $50,000 from the city treasury into the hands of the assessors, instead of having this amount of money wasted in building a school-house. The assessors, in return for this, will tell us how many children are not attending school. Superintendent Brooks told us last January that there were 20,000 children of school age not attending school, and 6,600 other children on half-time, but, instead of building school-houses for these waifs and providing for their education, we have had a law passed to give the assessors $40,000 a year, and to punish parents who do not send their children to schools that do not exist. And the assessors will get their pay, "whether school keeps or not," for the law provides for their compensation, and, if councils should refuse or neglect to make an appropriation, they can get their pay by the aid of the convenient mandamus.

Those Facts—What are They?

To the Editor of Liberty:

Mr. Salter, in his reply to Mr. Yarros, says he "judges from facts of the past" that anarchy would work badly in protecting life and property. May I ask whether these facts of the past are specified in Mr. Salter's book, and, if not, whether he will specify them for us when he next writes to Liberty?

Stephen T. Byington.

The Recruiting Officer.

Well I remember me of him
Who to the quiet village came
With beat of drum and torch's glare
To mouth of war, nor paint it grim,
But winsome, seeking to inflame
Man 'gainst his fellow; how the blare
Of parrot eloquence awoke
The sleeping lust of fight, with all
Its glorious panoply; while, veiled
By sophistry, as when the smoke
Of battle blinds its crime and woe,
His fine words laughed away death's pall.
He with smooth pleas their cause assailed,
And cowards did yclep the foe.
The sharp, shrewd money-getter kept
His place, nor dared beyond his sphere;
But to that tune the young soul leapt—
That charm of falsehoods! Hearts that broke,
And pain and sorrow year by year,
The sequence. Back with laugh and joke
By midnight train the talker passed,
Back to those fragrant, silken-draped boudoirs,
Red cups of wine and pink-limbed paramours.

The Soldier.

From happy wedlock sprang a child-
A boy; amid the fields he grew
To strength and beauty (joyous days
Of innocence among the wild
Flowers of the wood); his eyes of blue
Drank from high heaven their winsome hue,
And in his wavy hair of gold
The glory of the sun was rolled.
Unmarred in any part, he came
Upon his years of manhood, met
His faultless mate,—a sweet brunette.
An evil time; for then the flame
Of war burst forth; and needs must he,
Fed by the fantasy of Fame,
And dreaming some men might be free
By slaying others, join the fray.
I saw him as he silent lay,
His arms above his head, his face
Black with a few hours' death; and cold
That form divine—the model of the race—
That should have been bequeathed t'adorn the world.

William Walstein Gordak.

Liberty.

Issued Fortnightly at Two Dollars a Year; Single Copies, Eight Cents.

BENJ. R. TUCKER, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER.

Office of Publication, 24 Gold Street.
Post Office Address: LIBERTY, P. O. Box No. 1312, New York, N. Y.

Entered at New York as Second-Class Mail Matter.

NEW YORK, N. Y., MAY 16, 1896.

"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the exciseman, the erasing-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel." — PROUDHON.

☞ The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

Mr. Salter's Defence.

I.

In view of the extreme and fundamental importance of the questions involved in this discussion, I trust that the reader will carefully and patiently consider the arguments submitted by Mr. Salter in the last issue of Liberty, and, after refreshing his memory by glancing at my original articles, follow the present reply to Mr. Salter's defence. Whether or no Mr. Salter's book was an attempt to refute the position of philosophical individualist Anarchism (and I admit that he is right in averring that he did not *directly* challenge our position), it is certain that his defence must be regarded as such an attempt.

It is to be borne in mind that Mr. Salter represents the whole modern school of what may be called Sociologists-of-the-Chair. I have been reading the new works of Professor Giddings and Professor Willoughby, and I find that their criticisms upon the Spencerian view of society and government are based upon the same general considerations that Mr. Salter advances in opposition to the ideas expressed in my review of his book. Mr. Salter says everything—without the elaboration, of course, which a larger work permits—that *can* be said on behalf of the school referred to, and to deal with him is to deal with the whole school. If there be any lack of clearness and consistency in Mr. Salter's statement, it is not to be attributed to the form or method of the advocate, but to the weakness of the cause itself. The trouble is with the theory, not with its proponents.

Mr. Salter's main inquiry was, as he states, "whether anarchy would work under existing conditions." That government would be a superfluity in an ideal state of society "goes without saying"; the question, it may be added, is of no importance whatever, since every one is entirely willing to be called an Anarchist in that sense. But, when Mr. Salter contends that Anarchy would be worse than government to-day, he indirectly attacks our position, and it is incumbent upon us to examine his grounds for this contention. I endeavored to show that Mr. Salter was not satisfactory either in his theoretical or in his practical demonstration, and it is now necessary to analyze his defence and see whether he has improved his case. Before doing so, however, one word with regard to my charge that Mr. Salter misrepresented the Anarchistic position by identifying Anarchism with non-resistance. Have I been "more acute than sympathetic," and have I interpreted the passages on this point with undue literalism? Here are Mr. Salter's words (italics mine):

> Anarchy is not inconsistent with association, but only with enforced association. It means simply a state of society in which no one is bound or obliged *to do anything* (whether to associate with others or anything else); it is not opposed to order, but only to *enforced order*; not to rule, but only to obligatory rule. In other words, it is synonymous with *liberty*. Under such a system individuals would simply be left *free to do as they choose*; compulsion would *disappear*; the only bonds in society would be *moral* bonds.

Now I submit that such a description of Anarchy is incorrect and misleading. I have italicized the erroneous parts of the description. It is not necessary to be unduly literal in interpretation to reject this description; it is necessary simply to be logical and precise. What Mr. Salter should have written, and what he now tells us he meant to write, is something like this.

"Anarchy means simply a state of society in which no one is bound or obliged to do anything beyond that enjoined by equal liberty; it is not opposed to order, or to order enforced by voluntary associations, based on voluntary taxation, but only to the enforcement of order by any invasive organization which begins by violating the most fundamental right of all; not to rule in the sense of coercion of invaders, but to rule in the sense of enforced coöperation and submission without regard to invasion. In other words, it is synonymous with equal liberty. Under such a system all non-invasive individuals would simply be left free to do as they choose; compulsion would disappear, except in so far as it would be necessary to enforce equal liberty."

The difference between the two statements is radical and manifest. Mr. Salter now admits that he failed to express himself clearly, and that he really intended to describe the position of philosophical individualist Anarchism, and not that of Tolstoism. I think that no impartial reader who realizes the significance of the distinction will agree with Mr. Salter that I have interpreted him with undue literalism.

Having arrived at an understanding with reference to the problem, or subject-matter of the inquiry, let me see whether I cannot get Mr. Salter to admit that his method "may properly be called in question." In the first place, it was inexact to say, as I did, that it is necessary to determine whether Anarchy is "just and possible." In reality, it is necessary to determine only whether Anarchy is just. If we answer this question, everything else is added unto us by necessary implication. As an ethical leader, Mr. Salter must assent to this proposition. If Anarchy is just, it cannot be impossible or even inexpedient. If government is unjust and without any ethical warrant, *it* cannot be, in a scientific sense, possible and expedient. What philosophers and sociologists are called upon to do is to discover an ethical warrant for government. Spencer, we know, has tried it, and has failed. He is unable to discover any other warrant than consent, "practical unanimity"; and, when it is pointed out to him that no such unanimity exists, he is logically bound to decide that government has no ethical warrant. Mr. Salter, however,—in his book, at least,—proceeds upon the notion that, if he can prove, by "balancing advantages and disadvantages of government and Anarchy," that the latter would not, or does not, work well, his case is made out. Is it because he is convinced that a thing which does not work well cannot be just? If so, he is committed to the converse of the proposition,—that a thing which is just must necessarily work well,—and hence cannot decline to accept the purely ethical test and abide by the result of an abstract inquiry into the ethical status of government. Is it because he thinks that an appeal to facts and experience is more direct, fruitful, or scientific than the *a priori* method? Such an assumption is contrary to the testimony of science. If I should ask Mr. Salter whether murder is just, it would never occur to him to seek an answer in facts and experience. If ethical science could not answer that question in any other way, it would hardly be regarded as having reached an advanced state. Similarly, if I ask Mr. Salter whether government is just, and he refers me to facts and experience, he evidently implies that ethical science is so crude, immature, and undeveloped that it is incapable of giving a direct answer to my question. Of course, if this were really the case, we could do nothing but deplore the fact, and hope for better things in the future. But no greater blunder can be imagined than is involved in the notion that what ethical science cannot tell us "facts and experience" will, if we only interrogate them. Who can be sure that he has all the essential facts before him, and that his interpretation of them is sound?

Mr. Salter says that in his theoretical part he "urged that Anarchy was 'possible' and, by implication, possibly 'just.'" but that, when he came to deal with the practical question as to how Anarchy actually works and is likely to work, he knew of no way to answer it except to examine facts and experience. Here, it is clear, Mr. Salter uses the term "possible," not in the technical sense of compatible with the highest welfare, but in the popular sense. Now, in the popular, sense, nobody will claim that Anarchy is possible, just as no Anarchist denies that, in this same sense, government is possible, and usury is possible. But is Anarchy better than government as a condition of social stability and development? Mr. Salter thinks that it is not, and appeals to facts for support. Yet he "urged" that it is possibly "just"! Again I ask: how can that which is just be worse than that which is unjust? Certainly both government and Anarchy cannot be just, since they are mutually exclusive and irreconcilable.

If Mr. Salter had first proved by the *a priori* method that Anarchy is unjust, and then proceeded to balance advantages and disadvantages by way of strengthening and illustrating his deduction, his method could not have been objected to. Spencer very frequently appeals to facts and experience to exhibit the unfitness

and inefficiency of government, but he does that after attempting to prove *a priori* the injustice of governmental interference for any purpose save defence against aggression. It is significant that Spencer's facts have generally very little effect on those who are not convinced by his theoretical demonstrations. Mr. Salter's "facts and experience" will carry no more weight with those who fail to be impressed by his theoretical considerations.

However, in my review of the book I have tried to meet both the theoretical and practical considerations advanced by Mr. Salter, and I now propose to examine his additional arguments, or his replies to my criticisms.

Upon the subject of Anarchy in defensive war, Mr. Salter said very little in his book. He explains his brief and summary treatment of that fundamental question by stating that he had no idea that his position would be seriously challenged. He spoke of what "every one would feel" simply because he actually thought that every one did feel as he supposed, and, since my dissent has established the error of the supposition, he undertakes to supply the arguments originally omitted as superfluous. In substance, Mr. Salter's new argument is as follows: Right and wrong are measured by the welfare of the tribe or community, and it cannot be right for the individual to pursue a course of conduct inconsistent with the welfare of the community. The individual has not the right to do with himself as he pleases irrespective of the welfare of others about him, and hence no man can rightfully take his own life, or allow his life to be taken without resistance, when such conduct means injury or ruin to the community. To force a reluctant individual to defend his community is not, therefore, wrong, except in the case of persons having conscientious scruples against war of any kind. In other words, Mr. Salter maintains that the individual does not belong to himself, and that, even if life has no value to him, he is bound to live and work for the welfare of the community; and he further maintains that it cannot be wrong for the community to demand and enforce such subordination of the individual, because "wrong" means something injurious to the community, while the subordination alluded to is good and necessary for the community.

Now, I entirely agree with Mr. Salter that "right and wrong are measured by the welfare of the tribe or community," and that "in its origin conscience was a social sentiment." This is the Darwinian, or, rather, evolutionary, view of ethical sentiments and conceptions, but it is wholly consistent with the doctrine of individual sovereignty; and Mr. Salter is simply guilty of question-begging when, after stating this proposition regarding the *meaning* of right and wrong, or the *origin* of social sentiments, he immediately assumes that it is right for "the community" to force an individual to defend it, regardless of his own feelings in the matter. The conclusion does not follow from the premise. It is true that everything wrong which is injurious to the community, and that everything is right which is beneficial and necessary to the community. But whether a thing is or is not necessary and beneficial to the community is itself a question. As I have repeatedly insisted, the Anarchistic position, the demand for absolute non-interference with the non-aggressive, rests precisely on the contention that such conduct is in the highest degree advantageous to the community, and that the society which will respect equality of liberty and decline to force non-invasive individuals into coöperation even for purposes of defensive war will be happier, freer, more stable and harmonious and progressive, than any other society. We assert that individual sovereignty is the essential condition of *social* well-being, and that coercion of the non-invasive individual is injurious and demoralizing to the community as a whole. The difference, then, between Mr. Salter and myself is that he assumes certain things to be necessary and beneficial to society which I hold to be injurious and fatal to it, and not at all with reference to the meaning of right and wrong, or the origin of social sentiments.

It may, I apprehend, seem paradoxical to affirm that the welfare of society demands that individuals shall be allowed to commit suicide or get themselves killed in preference to fighting with the rest of the society, or that individual sovereignty is the condition of social growth and prosperity. The trouble is that writers persist in speaking and thinking about the relations and conditions which prevailed under early militarism, and entirely overlook the great changes brought about by industrialism and the corresponding modification in sentiments. Individual sovereignty under early militancy was an impossibility, and no member of the warring tribes ever dreamed of demanding the right of secession, or of declining to coöperate with his fellows. Men lived by war, and discipline, despotic control, and individual subordination are the conditions of success in war. Men's sentiments, always molded by surroundings and necessities, naturally corresponded to their external relations. To assert that the conditions of social stability and prosperity are substantially the same to-day is, as I have said, to ignore evolution. I cannot dwell on this, nor is it necessary, since Spencer's treatment of this subject leaves nothing to be desired.

Mr. Salter observes that it has been reserved to the philosophical Anarchist of to-day to discover the "abstract, absolute right of the individual to do with himself as he pleases, irrespective of the welfare of others about him." In a sense, this is true, and we are entitled to credit for it, although Spencer, who is not strictly a philosophical Anarchist, promulgated this doctrine in the first edition of "Social Statics." Yes, we do affirm that the individual has the right to do with himself as he pleases, irrespective of the welfare of others, and we claim that this right, or liberty, is essential to the welfare, not only of the individual members of society, but of the "social organism" itself. Of course, the "social organism" is a fiction, but what I mean is that the society which recognizes and respects this right is, under present industrial conditions, the fittest and the one most certain to survive. Strange to say, "society" itself, speaking through its legislatures, judges, and "public opinion," is gradually discovering the truth of the Anarchistic principle. The most enlightened States have either abrogated anti-suicide laws, or relegated them to the lumber-room of dead-letter legislation. This is a tacit admission of the absurdity of the claim that an individual who has found life a burden and curse is bound to live and suffer for the sake of "society." The world is, I fear, tending Anarchyward, and repudiating the strict "social organism" theory. It does this in obedience to the new sentiments produced under the *régime* of industrialism, and will do more in the same direction when its ideas on the subject become clearer and more exact.

Indeed, Mr. Salter himself unconsciously retreats from his position when he concedes to Quakers and non-resistants the right to ignore society and refuse to defend it against invaders. This concession is utterly unjustifiable on principle. If men belong to society, have no right to do with themselves as they please, and are bound to subordinate their own interests and inclinations to the welfare of "others," then no amount of "conscientious" scruples can relieve an individual from the duty of serving society. Isn't it preposterous to plead conscientious scruples when the very existence of the community is at stake, and when failure to offer due resistance means the annihilation of everybody, including the men whose scruples prevent them from fighting? What is the real meaning of the plea? The Quakers and non-resistants say to the community: "We do not believe in killing, even in self-defence; we prefer to risk being killed ourselves; and we would rather have the community destroyed than attempt to resist invasion by physical force." What becomes of their duty to the community? Will Mr. Salter urge that they have higher duties than those they owe to the community? It would be rather difficult for him to name them, I fancy, in view of his own emphatic assertion that "right and wrong are measured by the welfare of the community," and that it cannot be wrong for society to demand of individuals the doing of that which is essential to social welfare. From his point of view, the alleged "conscientious scruples" are malignantly anti-social sentiments, and their possessors are enemies of society. How can that be conscientious which violates "conscience"—*the* social sentiment, as Mr. Salter asserts?

The inconsistency is glaring, and Mr. Salter's only escape from the dilemma is in the admission that, whatever may have been the case in the early stages of social evolution, to-day the welfare of society is best subserved by respecting the conscientious scruples against violence, since the existence of such sentiments is one of the strongest evidences of human development and socialization. To say this, however, is to imply that men no longer belong to society, but are independent sovereign individuals, in the sense that they have, or ought to have, the liberty to do as they please with themselves, irrespective of the welfare of others.

Now, when the Anarchists would exempt, not only non-resistants, but all those who prefer to commit suicide from other motives, or who wish to defend themselves in their own way, Mr. Salter is estopped from using against them the argument that right and wrong are measured by social welfare. The obvious answer which he must anticipate is: Granted that right and wrong are measured by social welfare; but it does not follow that a given course is necessary

to social welfare because some one asserts that it is. We maintain that there is no better way to secure social welfare than to recognize the principle of the sovereignty of the individual over himself, and the right of each to do as he pleases within the limits of equal freedom.

Before dropping this part of the argument, let me refer again to the fundamental question of right and wrong. I have said that I agree with Mr. Salter and the evolutionists that "right or wrong has generally been what men felt they might do, or might not do, consistently with the security and welfare of the larger aggregate." But I entirely dissent from the conclusion that this implies the conscious subjection or subordination of individual interests to those of society. On the contrary, the individual *subserves* his own interests by obeying his sentiment of justice. Properly understood, the interests of the individual and the aggregate are identical. The aggregate has no existence apart from the existence of the units. Society is happy, prosperous, and free only when its members are happy, prosperous, and free. Society, I repeat, is a scientific abstraction; there are only individuals. But the conditions of happiness are the same for all of them, or for all except those under-developed persons whose instincts or impulses are predatory. When we insist, then, on right and just conduct, we insist on that which is beneficial and necessary for all, and no subjection or subordination is contemplated. Societies exist only because they are agencies or means of individual progress. Men surrender nothing in entering society; that ancient fallacy is exploded. They gain in every way by the social relation. They are what they are in consequence of social conditions. Society is simply indirect coöperation for material, intellectual, and moral development, and, if it ceased to subserve individual needs, it could not survive; men would simply abandon the social state.

If these propositions are sound, there is no antagonism between social and individual interests. That alone is good for "society" which is good for all of its members. To ask any number of individuals to sacrifice themselves for "society"—that is, for the rest of the membership—is to deprive them of every motive for wishing to lead a social life. The individual has no need for society, if it does not tend to increase his happiness.

But how about the invasive, the men with predatory proclivities? it may be asked. A moment's reflection shows that they are not required to sacrifice or subordinate themselves to society. They are merely required to respect the limits which *everybody* is bound to observe, the limits imposed by associative life. He is allowed as much liberty as his neighbor or fellow-member, and prevented only from infringing upon the rig[illegible]l liberty of others. In no sense can this be called subordination. It is unfortunate for him that he is under-developed, and that his sentiments are anti-social; but he is required to refrain only from pursuing courses of conduct inconsistent with the liberty of other men. He is denied nothing which anybody else is permitted to enjoy.

We come now to the question of the majority's title to represent society; this will require a separate article. V. Y.

Mr. Yarros's Ethics in His Way.

Without the smallest desire to turn the controversy between Mr. Yarros and Mr. Salter into a triangular one, I am, nevertheless, under the necessity, in order to preserve the integrity of Liberty's editorial policy, of disclaiming some of the positions now taken by Mr. Yarros. As soon as I had read Mr. Salter's answer, I foresaw trouble; for I knew that Mr. Yarros, in his rejoinder, would be obliged to deal with Mr. Salter from the standpoint of fundamental ethics, and in fundamental ethics Mr. Yarros and I are as far apart as the poles. Yet, as the controversy had been begun in the editorial columns, it seemed, on the whole, the better way to let it proceed there, and mend matters as best as I could by taking an occasional exception over my own signature.

Let me say at once, then, that Liberty dissents from the doctrine propounded both by Mr. Salter and Mr. Yarros that "right and wrong are measured by the welfare of the tribe or community," so far as this implies that there is a single standard of right, observance of which is incumbent upon all. If, indeed, the tribe or community were itself a personality; if it had such a thing as a sensorium or seat of consciousness,—then, truly enough, *its* right and wrong would be measured by its own welfare, just as every individual's right and wrong is measured by his or her own welfare. But on the lips of men who, like Mr. Yarros and Mr. Salter, reject the theory that society is an organism and deny the existence of a social sensorium, the words quoted above are utterly meaningless, the veriest nonsense. The words right and wrong, so far as they can be looked upon as expressive of rational concepts, are simple equivalents of advisability and unadvisability of certain courses of conduct viewed from the standpoint of the welfare of the conceiver; and, as it is in the fundamental nature of the conceiver to make his own happiness paramount and measure his conduct accordingly, and as there are as many conceivers as there are individuals, so there are as many rights and wrongs as there are individuals: with this qualification, however, that,— when two or more individuals agree upon a common line of conduct as the one most highly advantageous, they unify right and wrong so far as they themselves are concerned.

Now, the process of unification has been going on, at quicker or slower pace, during the entire evolution of the human race; so that there has come to be, at the present day, a considerable and, in regard to some things, a predominant consensus of opinion in favor of the theory that one of the tendencies of evolution is to show that men, as a rule, best serve their own interests by assuming the interests of all to be harmonious instead of antagonistic, and by allowing, as a consequence, the freest play to individual exercise and development,—that is to say, a consensus of opinion in favor of the theory that equal liberty is an essential condition of the highest social achievement. To those who, having attained this stage of mental development, are able to join in this consensus of opinion, the idea of the dependence of social progress upon equal liberty is so rational, and any idea to the contrary is so irrational, that, having to solve any special social problem, the first question that they ask themselves is not which of the various solutions proposed offers the greatest balance of advantage, but which is in harmony with equal liberty. From this point of view I am heartily with Mr. Yarros in claiming that the test of justice is the proper one to apply to any social proposition or philosophy, and that Mr. Salter's rule-of-thumb method implies ignorance of one of the foundation principles of society. But I do not adopt the test of justice for Mr. Yarros's reasons. I do not hold that that which is just cannot in any case be inexpedient. I hold that emergencies are liable to arise in the lives of men and of societies when all principles except that of self-preservation must be thrown to the winds; that there are moments when the continuance of individual life and social relations depends on the promptness with which we violate the very rules of conduct that in ordinary and normal times contribute most vitally to our well-being. But it does not follow from this that in the ordinary course of evolution we must, with every change of circumstance, submit these rules of conduct to a fresh weighing in the scales of experience or to fresh speculation as to the advantage or disadvantage of acting upon them, any more than it would follow from the possible necessity of inhaling a poisonous gas as an antidote to some other violent poison suddenly taken into the system that we must consider the advisability of discontinuing the breathing of pure air in view of a threatened epidemic of cholera. Now, having satisfied myself that equal liberty is as essential to social health as is pure air to individual health, it is enough for me, when confronted with a social proposition, to inquire whether it satisfies or goes counter to the requirements of equal liberty. For these reasons, but not for those put forward by Mr. Yarros, I stand practically with Mr. Yarros against Mr. Salter as to the method by which the subject in hand should be treated.

On the other hand, I admit that, if Mr. Salter has not reached that height from which the necessity of equal liberty to social life appears as an almost self-evident truth,—if, in other words, he cannot see that human development is not to be secured by [illegible]ing the hands and minds of non-invasive men,—he is fully justified in pursuing the rule-of-thumb method. But in that case I put him in the category in which I put the man who comes forward to question the advisability of breathing pure air. I am ready to listen to either of them, when either shall come forward with facts of sufficient moment to make it worth my while. But, unless these facts shall be overwhelming; unless they are exhaustive, leaving no possibility that other facts of importance have been ignored; unless they all point undeniably to one logical conclusion,—I shall refuse to abandon either equal liberty or pure air, even though some of the facts cited I am unable to explain. And, with all these conditions seemingly fulfilled, I should resort to authority and impurity only tentatively, in half distrust of my senses and my reason, and in constant fear of disaster. It seems to me that that State Socialism which tries to defend itself by the claim that it does not violate equal liberty is far more rational in its method than this Socialism-of-the-Chair, which plays with equal liberty almost as if it

were a toy.

Upon the question of compulsory coöperation in military defence I simply note that this sort of compulsory coöperation, like any other sort, is a violation of equal liberty, and there I rest. In other words, I am interested in it only as a theoretical question,—one which helps me to understand, explain, and illustrate what equal liberty is. Practically I am too frequently confronted with actual violations of equal liberty to worry much over this possible violation of it. As a practical question its decision must always rest on the gravity of the emergency which the occasion presents. Inasmuch as the very consideration of the question contemplates the possibility of war even at the present day, it seems to me that Mr. Yarros, who declares that despotism is the condition of success in war and who is not a non-resistant, is bound by his own argument (though it is inconsistent with his other argument that the just is always expedient) to admit that a defensive war, necessitating compulsory coöperation, may be justifiable and admissible. In that case Mr. Salter is entitled to remind him that his remarks about the displacement of militarism by industrialism are irrelevant to this practical question of the moment, since the question itself is an admission that such displacement has not yet occurred, or is as yet incomplete. Mr. Salter's willingness to exempt Quakers and other "conscientious" non-resistants from military service is laughably weak, and I concur in Mr. Yarros's criticisms upon it. But, when Mr. Yarros says to Mr. Salter: "Isn't it preposterous to plead conscientious scruples when the very existence of the community is at stake?" I am tempted to turn upon Mr. Yarros with the parallel question: Isn't it preposterous to plead equal liberty when the very existence of the community is at stake?

Notwithstanding the exceptions which I have taken above, of course I join hands most heartily with Mr. Yarros in his main contention that none of the harmful things done by non-invasive men can injure others to a degree approaching that in which others and all would be and are injured by the policy of coercing non-invasive men. But here again I must except to his statement that to coerce the invasive is not to require their subordination. Coercion of the invasive is not tyranny, to be sure; on the contrary, it is defence against tyranny. But he who successfully defends himself against a tyrant subordinates the tyrant's wishes to his own, just as truly as the successful tyrant subordinates his victim. Anarchism is not the doctrine of no subordination; it is the doctrine that none but the invasive should be subordinated. To say that restraint upon the predatory does not subordinate their instincts to those of the non-predatory, or to society if you will, is to deceive oneself with words. T.

Why is it that "Paragraphs" is not published once a day, instead of once a month, that I, like Zola, might flourish on a morning meal of "green and slimy toad"? I am envious of the great novelist.

Florida School Law Up to Date.

[American Missionary.]

Rev. T. S. Perry, of Limerick, Me.; Mr. O. Dickinson, of West Granville, Mass.; Principal B. D. Rowlee, of East Woodstock, Conn.; Mrs. B. D. Rowlee; Miss Edith M. Robinson, of Battle Creek, Mich.; Miss H. S. Loveland, of Newark Valley, N. Y.; and Miss Margaret Ball, of Orange Park, Fla., with two patrons of the school (white) residing in Orange Park, —were all arrested by the sheriff at Orange Park, Fla., on Friday, the tenth of April, charged with the crime of teaching young people of two races under the same roof. They were not taken to jail, but were given until Monday—the intervening days of Saturday and Sunday—to procure bail. This esteemed pastor of the Congregational church in Orange Park, the most worthy teachers, and the patrons are awaiting trial for this crime! and are only saved from jail by the bail which has been procured for them. This is as far as the State of Florida has descended in its shame at present.

[This school has been run in open defiance of the law referred to (which the missionary society claims is unconstitutional and void) since last fall, as readers of Liberty will remember; so at any rate the sheriff cannot be charged with unseemly haste in enforcing the law.]

Civilization and Liberty.

To the Editor of Liberty:

Mr. Bolton Hall's opinions in No. 332 completely took my breath away. Thus he writes: "It appears to me that nations . . . have attained . . . to the very highest phases of civilization, with almost no regard for personal liberty or the rights of the individual."

I ask myself: how will this statement do as a complete philosophy of history! For aught that I have ever heard or read, have ever learned by tale or history, this proposed philosophy of history is completely erroneous; in fact, it appears to me so ideally false that it all but demonstrates the possibility of special inspiration to him who devotedly pursues error. Would a true history of the rise and fall of Athens support Mr. Hall's dictum? If memory disserve me not, Pericles, standing at the very pinnacle of the greatest of ancient civilizations, delivered an oration, in which he pointed out to his fellow-Athenians that the very essence of their greatness and the mark of their superiority to all other peoples was in the greater personal rights and duties of all the members of that "fierce democracie." What made Athens the eye of Greece and the uncompanioned glory of the ancient world, if it was not the right which each one of her citizens had to speak and do the thing he would,—a right which conferred upon mankind the greatest literature, dramatic, political, and ethical, that the ancient world produced? Was it not the beginning of the end when the people buried this right and Socrates, the immortal midwife of the mind, in one grave?

The Roman armies at last conquered those of Greece, history revealing that this end was made easy by the greater freedom of action possible to the Roman soldier as opposed to the cumbersome Macedonian phalanx which tied each soldier to several of his fellows, thus sacrificing freedom of individual action to the action of the troops *en masse*.

It is necessary to say to Mr. Hall that governments are tolerated only so long as they exhibit some measure of regard for personal liberty and the rights of the individual; when governments lose this regard, they have their day, and sooner or later cease to be. The period of Rome's undoubted greatness exhibits personal liberty and the rights of the individual at their maximum. The period of the deepest degradation exhibits those rights at their minimum, when we see that only one person in all Rome has any rights, the wearer of the imperial purple, and his right is—the right to be assassinated in his own bed; the later emperors would have been most unsatisfactory members of any life-insurance company.

Why did Rome fall? What was the source of the dissensions which laid broad and deep the foundations of her decline and fall? Proudhon quotes Sallust as follows: "'We call men and gods to witness,' said the soldiers of Catiline, who were Roman citizens with not a slave among them, 'that we have taken arms, neither against the country, nor to attack any one, but in defence of our lives and liberties. Wretched and poor, most of us deprived of country, all of us of fame and fortune, by the violence and cruelty of usurers, we have no rights, no property, no liberty.'"

Let us quote again from Proudhon, in the hope that M. Hall and many others may be led to seek the flood of fierce light which the great writer pours around these questions. "From the time of Nero, six individuals were the sole proprietors of one-half of Roman Africa. In the fifth century the wealthy families had incomes of no less than two millions: some possessed as many as twenty thousand slaves." Proudhon quotes Pliny as saying: "Large estates have ruined Italy, and are ruining the provinces." I would like to quote one other most interesting and instructive passage from Proudhon's second memoir on "What is Property?"—a quotation from M. Laboulaye and the author's comments thereon—but I must let one sentence suffice: "Gardens and groves replaced the fields, and the free population fled to the towns. . . . One day later and three hundred thousand starving men walked the streets of Rome: that was a revolution."

These men were denied the Single-Taxer's "primal God-given right" of tilling the soil, and Henry George correctly affirms that at the time when this picture was taken Rome was rotting at the heart.

It would be interesting to hear Mr. Hall's estimate of the *Renaissance*. Are we wrong in supposing that the glory of that great movement consists precisely in its assertion of the rights of personal freedom,—freedom of thought, speech, and action? Are we wrong in saying that the nameless iniquity of the Inquisition consists precisely in its denial of these rights?

I trust that Mr. Hall will rewrite his philosophy of history to read as follows: "The sole security of any society rests in the personal liberty which it assures to each of its individual units, and the epitaph is already written on every nation which disregards the rights of the individual. There is no power in the universe, neither in heaven or hell, which can confer immortality upon inhumanity; a perpetuity of wrong is an impossible conception." ERWIN M'CALL.

Future "Humanity."

[Translated from the German of Nietzsche by George Schumm.]

When I look with the eyes of a distant age toward our own, I cannot discover anything more remarkable in contemporary man than his peculiar virtue and ailment called "the historical sense." It is the beginning of something wholly new and strange in history; given a few centuries or more, and this germ may at length develop into a wonderful plant with an equally wonderful odor, on account of which our old earth would be pleasanter to live on than has hitherto been the case. We of the present time are just beginning to form the chain of a future very powerful sentiment, link for link; we hardly know what we are doing. It almost seems to us as if the case were not one of a new sentiment, but one of the decline of all old sentiments; the historical sense is still something so poor and cold, and many are affected by it as by a frost, and are made by it still poorer and colder. To others it appears as the symptom of the approach of old age, and our planet is to them a despondent invalid who, in order to forget the present, records the history of his youth. Indeed, this is one color of this new sentiment; whoso can feel the history of man collectively as *his own history* experiences in an enormous generalization all the sorrow of an invalid who remembers his health, of the old man who recalls the dreams of his youth, of the lover who loses his sweetheart, of the martyr whose ideal is destroyed, of the hero on the evening of the battle which decided nothing and brought him wounds and the loss of his friend; but to bear this tremendous sum of varied sorrow, to be able to bear it, and yet prove the hero who, on the approach of the second day of battle, greets the dawn and his fortune, as the man with a horizon of ages before and after him, as the heir of all the nobility of all past thought and the bound heir, as at once the noblest of all ancient nobles and the first of a new nobility whose like no age has ever seen or dreamed of, —to take all this upon one's soul, oldest things, newest things, losses, hopes, conquests, victories of mankind, to hold all this at length in one soul and weld it into one sentiment,—this would surely have to result in a happiness such as man has never known,—a God's happiness full of power and of love, full of tears and of laughter, a happiness which, like the sun at evening, continually gives and pours into the sea of its inexhaustible wealth, and which, like the sun, feels most opulent only when also the poorest fisherman paddles with golden oars! This divine sentiment would then be—humanity!—*Fröhliche Wissenschaft.*

Anarchist.

As one upon no mission bent
I came—no sacerdotal cause
Save just to live by nature's laws,
And her direct arbitrament
To hold in awe; to please myself,
And thus the world a service do;
To thrive devoid the greed of pelf,
The product of my labor mine;
To worship at the hallowed shrine
Befitting me, and love the new,
Which is the old unveiled again;
To crouch to none, to crave no sway,
But inward from the leagues of blue
To drink the gladness of the lively day,
To dwell in peace, and bear no fruitless pain.

But I—who love the wood and stream,
The winning voice of Day and Night,
And man and beast, and Art and Song;
And fain would wander in a dream
Of life and love, and seek delight
In gentle moods, forgetting wrong,
Musing o'er mellow sunsets, lost
In contemplation's misty deep,—
I, who would ever seek to find
The mystery that lurks behind
Fair nature's apparition, must
Into this bitter warfare leap,
The unaccustomed steel upon me bind,
And, facing Hell, give biting thrust for thrust.

William Walstein Gordak.

In Defence of the Single Tax.

My dear Mr. Tucker:

I am much pleased at the kind words of yourself and Mr. Yarros concerning me in the issue of April 18, and I think it a very fair shot that you give me in saying that the thought that the matter of Mr. Stephens's remark was not worth mention is one that might well have occurred to me at an earlier stage of the proceedings. I wish to say, however, that I never feared a quarrel, and used the word "misunderstanding" in a much stricter and more accurate sense than you gave me credit for. I wanted Mr. Stephens to know exactly what I had written you, in order that no two of us might hereafter, about this matter, seem at cross purposes, one misconceiving what had passed between the other two. Of course I have nothing further to say upon the subject of my previous letter to you. Mr. Stephens and you will undoubtedly take care of it.

Nor have I any excuse to offer for the treatment of Mr. Yarros at the Chicago Single Tax Club, if Mr. Trinkaus is accurate in his report. I was not present, but I know enough of Mr. Yarros to know that whatever he said was worthy of, and should have received, not only courteous, but attentive and thoughtful consideration. I beg, however, to differ from Mr. Trinkaus in the implication which he makes that intolerance and incivility are always signs of defective intelligence and ability, and, were it at all germane to the argument, which I do not hold it to be, I could, I think, describe to him scenes at meetings of Anarchists where courtesy and respectful hearing of opponents' arguments have been wanting. But, like Mr. Stephens's remark to me about the meeting before the Art Club, I do not think the "matter worth mention."

I am, however, disposed to say a word concerning Mr. Yarros's criticism of my remarks when Mr. Salter read his paper on the Single Tax before the Economic Section of the Chicago Ethical Culture Society. I do not propose to enter into any long argument or discussion of it, for I have not the time to do so, but I cannot admit that my answer to Mr. Salter's propositions that under the Single Tax there would be no free land, but simply land taxed up to the highest rental value, and that under that system labor would have to pay for land to the State at least as much as it has to pay to private landlords, was weak or a failure. I do not think Mr. Yarros shows his usual acumen and force in so regarding it.

In the first place, whether or not the belief of all Single Taxers (so far as I know) that the destruction of speculation in land would be brought about by the adoption of the Single Tax, and would be of very great advantage to all las[...]s, is well founded or not, it certainly was a very great defect in an argument against the importance of our theory that it omitted all reference to this cardinal proposition of our whole school. Mr. Salter was presumably meeting the arguments which Single Taxers advance,—that natural opportunities would be freed by the adoption of the Single Tax. In doing so he omitted all reference to the one fundamental proposition upon which that argument is based, and to point that fact out, even without entering upon a discussion of the position at all, was sufficient to seriously discredit the effectiveness of his address.

But I go farther: Mr. Yarros very cavalierly dismisses the proposition that, if land speculation were destroyed, the demand for labor would be great enough to give work and wages to the army of the unemployed, and to raise the rate of wages of those who are already employed, by saying that "no one can advance such a preposterous claim." With all deference to his ability and fairness, I do not in the first place regard the claim as "preposterous"; and, in the second, I know that it *is* advanced by many able and highly rational men. From his further statement that wherever it is profitable to improve land it is generally improved without compulsion of the Single Tax, and that the evil of land speculation is confined to new and undeveloped countries, I entirely dissent. Single Taxers do not propose to abolish the ownership of land in the sense of abolishing private titles, but they do propose to abolish that which makes of the private ownership of land a great source of economic evils, and of discouragement to its use and improvement. That which does so make the present system of private ownership of land thus evil is the encouragement of land speculation which it affords. Every untilled field, every unused mine or quarry, within the limits of a civilized community, every vacant lot in every city,—and I submit that there are vacant lots in every city of the world,—affords proof of this. When a man who owns land may accumulate wealth by doing nothing with the land, improvement is discouraged and retarded. If the possessor of land had to pay the value of it every year as one holding it upon ground rents does, he would have to improve his holding in order to profit by it, and no man can improve land without the employment of labor. It is not true, as it seems to me, that the rent of land, when paid to the State under the Single-Tax system, would be as great as it is when it is paid to private individuals. The constant discounting of the future by persons who expect land values to rise, and look to accumulate fortunes because there will be a greater demand thereafter than now for the use of the land which they own, raises land values in every part of the civilized world without exception, and land values are but the capitalization of ground rents. We hold that all ground rents would fall under the Single-Tax system, and that a great deal of land—not a small and trifling amount, as Mr. Yarros seems to think—would become practically free land. It is not necessary that the entire body of laborers should be given access to free land, to raise the wages of labor. If but a small percentage of all the laboring men of the world found free access to natural opportunities, competition would result between employers for liberty, instead of as now between laborers for employment.

I know very well that many hold the belief that, however opportunities for labor might be freed or increased, the increase in population would press always upon the means of subsistence, but I am not a Malthusian, and do not propose to enter upon the discussion of that proposition in this letter.

Nor can I go into the question of whether land speculation could be abolished by what Mr. Yarros calls the simple and direct way of refusing to recognize titles to unoccupied and unused land. I can only say that it seems to me that the Single Tax is the method best adapted to our circumstances and to the conditions of life around us at present for limiting possession of land to its use. By making it unprofitable to hold land except for use, it would make it economically impossible for men to hold more than could be used to advantage, while constituting every man his own judge of the amount and the character of the land that he could so use.

I do not expect to change Mr. Yarros's opinion by these few words, but I desire to protest against his dogmatic assertion that my comment upon Mr. Salter's address reduced the Single Tax to a very insignificant affair. I am still as much as ever of the opinion, first, that the chief end to which the Single-Tax theory is directed is the abolition of land speculation; secondly, that it would be effective to that end; and, thirdly, that the securing of that end would be, not indeed a "panacea," but the greatest of all means at present practicable and feasible for the amelioration of our distressing economic and social conditions.

I am sorry to be classed by you among the dangerous opponents of liberty, for I hold it to be the one thing of supreme importance to mankind. But, seeing things so differently, I must be content to fall under that unfavorable opinion.

It may not be amiss for me to say, however, that I am a firm believer in the right of all men to *equal* liberty, and that the only justification which I find for the government for which you find none is the necessity of limiting the liberty of each so that he may not infringe the equal liberty of every other.

The State, which does more than thus to protect the equal liberty of its citizens, is usurping power, but the prevention, by the Single Tax or otherwise, of the monopolization of natural opportunities and the consequent interference with the equal rights of citizens to such opportunities is such a protection of equal liberty; *me judice!* Very truly,

Edward Osgood Brown.

Lamentations Against the State.

[Octave Mirbeau in Le Journal.]

Yesterday morning appeared at my house a gentleman whom I don't know. Upon his insistance that he should be received at once,—for the affair of which he desired to speak to me admitted, he said, of no delay, —I ordered that he should be shown to my room. He had a very good countenance, although he was slightly agitated.

"Pray excuse my indiscretion," he said to me, "but I am worn out, worn out, worn out" . . .

"It is not physiological," I declared, "that a healthy and virtuous man should be worn out so early in the morning. Unless you are a gambler or a rake, it must be something very serious that brings you here."

"Very serious, indeed!"

"Then what is it, Monsieur?"

"It is, Monsieur," answered the stranger, forcibly, "thtt I can no longer live in this stupid land of red tape. I have enough of France, and I wish to be naturalized as a Boer or a Hottentot. That is what it is!"

"But how does that concern me? And what can I do for you?"

"This. Mme. Séverine is away. M. Henry Bauer has gone to carry the artistic gospel to the southern shores of France. Of the few generous, compassionate, and vehement souls who do not fear to tell the truth to an imbecile and meddlesome society, you are to-day the only one to whom I can fraternally pour out my rancor. I do not ask you for money, or anything of the sort. I ask you only to listen to me for a few minutes. Then you will do what justice seems to you to dictate."

"I am listening."

And the visitor spoke as follows:

"I live in the suburbs of Paris, in the open country, almost two miles from a telegraph-office. Consequently my relations with Paris are not easy, and cost me as much as to deal with New York. I thought that I should not be indulging in luxury, if I were to have a telephone placed in my house. So I decided to subscribe. Do you follow me, Monsieur?"

"Perfectly."

"In the first place, they made me sign papers green, blue, yellow, red, and white, heaps of printed papers, of which I understood nothing at all, except that, before anything could be set in motion, I must pay down a certain sum of money,—to secure a footing, no doubt. I paid, and I waited. As I seemed to have been forgotten, I applied again to the administration, asking that the work of installation be begun. I received this answer:

"'We will begin that work, when the investigation is finished.'

"I was not a little puzzled.

"'An investigation? Why? And of what? Of

my morality, my fortune, my political opinions?'

"'Come, Monsieur, you are neither a Belgian, a Kaffir, or a Matabele, and you know very well that the French administration can do nothing whatever without an investigation. That causes delays, that annoys people, that throws things into confusion. That is what is needed!'

"I resigned myself to the situation, and another month passed. As nothing came, I went again to the administration.

"'And that investigation?' I asked.

"'The investigation is finished. But a complication has arisen. We are at loggerheads with the department of bridges and roads.'

"'With the department of bridges and roads? You astonish me greatly. What, pray, has the department of bridges and roads to do with my telephone?'

"'Your line has to cross one of the Seine bridges, has it not? Well, the department of bridges and road is opposed to this crossing. Or, at least, it is studying the question. Naturally we do not at all agree with them . . . and they do not agree at all with us'

"'Ah! And that may last a long time?'

"'We cannot tell. Two months, three months, perhaps six months. I could point you to a very curious case where we had to squabble with the department of bridges for fifteen months. It is very funny!'

"'It is idiotic and absolutely embarrassing. The department of bridges and roads is a State institution, is it not? And so is the department of posts and telegraphs, I suppose? Over what, then, can they squabble, as you say?'

"'Why, my dear and beloved taxpayer, if State institutions did not squabble among themselves and over your back, what would they do, I ask you? If all went well, there would be no more administration. One would think, indeed, that you had just come back from China!'

"'Would to heaven that I had gone to that free and civilized country! Be sure that I would not have come back.'

"At the end of the fourth month . . . do you still follow me?"

"Perfectly."

"At the end of the fourth month I witnessed the appearance of a gang of workmen, who set the poles and fastened the wires with methodical moderation. It remained only to put in the apparatus, in accordance with all the requirements of the regulations, in the way of which some new impediment—I forget what—interposed to delay the final installation three weeks more. At last, after innumerable and unforeseen movements back and forth, the telephone was in my house. It cost me very dear. I had to pay for the installation, then the amount of the monthly subscription, and, finally, what they call a 'provision'; for I pay not only the subscription, but also for each telephonic communication,—doubtless to simplify book-keeping and bureaucratic functions. It would be really too simple to unify the subscription price in a telephonic circuit. There would be no more administration, as the official said."

"Well, now your telephone is in operation, and you are content?"

"Not so fast. Do you know what happens to me? Ah! it is extraordinary! Well, this is what happens to me. Properly speaking, I have but half a telephone. I mean by that that, whenever I like and in proportion to the importance of my 'provision,' I can communicate with Paris, but that Paris cannot communicate with me. Whenever Paris asks to communicate, the person appointed to attend to this exercise inquires:

"'Have you a provision?'

"'No.'

"'No? Then good evening.'

"And in vain does Paris ring, in vain does Paris call. They do not even answer Paris. And every day my telephone remains as silent as if I had a log of wood on my desk. What would you have me do? I use it for a match-box."

The gentleman paced feverishly up and down my room.

"Another thing!" he exclaimed. "I have caterpillars and plant-lice in my garden. My trees and plants are attacked by all sorts of invisible and devouring enemies, which can be overcome by but one means,—nicotine. You know that the State monopolizes the manufacture and sale of this substance. Now, you think that one has only to walk into the State shop and say:

"'A quart of nicotine, if you please.'

"What a mistake! There, too, the complications are such that, as a general thing, one prefers to lose his crops rather than to go through the discouraging procedure which the State forces upon you. Listen carefully. You wish a quart of nicotine, we will say. First, you present yourself at the tobacco factory at the Quai d'Orsay. There you are led from office to office, where you must show that you are a horticulturist, an agriculturist, a winegrower, or a druggist,—these being the only classes of citizens to whom nicotine is delivered. This shown, they give you a little paper, with which you present yourself at the office of the collector of indirect taxes in your commune. This functionary, after having made you pay into his strong-box the price of the quart in question, hands you, in his turn, another little paper, with which you present yourself again at the factory at the Quai d'Orsay. A new promenade through the offices, where they *visé*, authenticate, homologate, and stamp this paper on the back, on the front, lengthwise, crosswise, diagonally, squarely, circularly, and triangularly; after which, equipped with this talisman, you are sent to a branch establishment in the Rue Nitot, where, after going through a sacrificial ritual, symbolical and diabolical, this paltry quart of nicotine is at last delivered to you. That takes three days. And so with everything, dear, generous, compassionate, and vehement writer. I cannot risk a step, test a wall, prune a tree, transport earth or drink, or perform the simplest act of domestic life, without the State's intervention, now to prevent me from doing what I want to do, always to rob me of my money and my time. For we do not lay sufficient stress on this tax of lost time with which the State overwhelms us. It is frightful!"

I tried to console my visitor, and I said to him:

"Do not be so downcast. The hour of social justice and individual liberty will soon strike. Thank God: the Socialists are gaining ground every day. A few months more, a few days perhaps, and we shall enter into the infinite joys of the promised land. For the admirable Socialists, Monsieur," . . .

But at this word "Socialists" my visitor uttered a cry of terror, and he bounded about in my room like a frightened cat.

"The Socialists!" he cried. "The State-baker, the State-butcher, the State-tailor, the State-ironmonger, the State-farmer, the State-Everything! You do not dream of that. To rise, to eat, to work, to urinate, to copulate and procreate, all at the same hour, at the sound of the same bell, to the tap of the same drum! No, no; you have decided me. I hesitate no longer. I'm off. I become a Hottentot. Farewell!"

And he disappeared behind the door, so quickly opened and so quickly shut again that I thought that he had vanished through the wall, like a ghost.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write to a target (which it is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, STEPHEN T. BYINGTON, Flushing Institute, Flushing, N. Y.

Why I believe in the Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps:

Fourth reason—because our shots will receive more attention and more respect if several are concentrated on a single target than if they go one at a time. The average man will at first regard Anarchism as a wild-cat notion of no importance; but, when he finds that a number of men are after him on this line, he will begin to feel that it has some little importance, and that it concerns him to know what these men are talking about. Then he will begin to read the letters for the purpose of understanding them, instead of for the purpose of getting through them. Even letters from people who have no talent for writing can be useful in this way,—by helping to draw attention to the letters of better writers.

Moral: Join the Corps.

Target, section A.—"Daily Globe," 242 Washington Street, Boston, Mass., on Sunday, May 3, published an interview with John Turner, the English Anarchist-Communist, who came over to help Mowbray convert America to that faith and has gone back again. Turner is described as a pleasant, respectable-seeming man, president of the United Shop Assistants' Union of London. He is quoted as saying:

> I find a deal of Anarchistic sentiment among Americans, even among those who would be the last to call themselves Anarchists.
>
> Anarchistic ideas are certainly spreading in England. The Socialist idea, which is much stronger and clearer, more definitely Socialistic than here, is continually furnishing recruits to the ranks of the Anarchists. The more extended the Socialist movement grows, the less violent it becomes.
>
> It started as a revolutionary movement ten or fifteen years ago in England, but just in proportion as it has entered the political arena, it has dropped its old interest in the poorest and worst-off section in society, the real *proletariat*, and caters to the small shop-keeping and better-off working class element, in the hope of catching votes at election time.
>
> I think highly of the organized labor movement of England, and my best hopes are centred upon it.
>
> Upon the whole, it is rapidly advancing in ideas.
>
> Eight years ago Socialism was ignored; now the first principles of Socialism are the ideals that animate the labor world, and, best of all, it has not been married to political action, as in Germany.
>
> Anarchists' principles are comparatively new to the English trade-unionists, but their influence is already being felt.
>
> The "new" trade union movement of five or six years ago was mainly political, and is already a spent force. In its young strength it carried things by force, and gained many advantages for unskilled labor by the big strikes it carried through successfully.
>
> But, carrying the poison of political action as "the" remedy, it slackened down to politics and impotence.
>
> Influenced by Anarchistic teachings, the trade unions are beginning to see that it is only by direct action on the part of the workers as a class against the employing and exploiting class that any improvement can really be gained.

He was converted to Anarchist-Communism by the executions at Chicago.

On Monday, May 4, the "Globe" reported a May Day demonstration Sunday night, addressed by Mowbray, Turner, Most, and several others. Its description of the meeting is as follows:

> It was a cosmopolitan and polyglot audience, very much in earnest and with a definite idea of the purpose of the meeting. The card of admission was headed, "Workingmen of the world, unite," and the gathering was announced as the "First grand May Day demonstration by the Anarchists of Boston."

Show why popular dread of Anarchism is unreasonable; that Anarchism should receive the same respectful consideration, with the expectation that something may be learned from it, as is accorded to Nationalism and other social movements. Advise people to get their ideas of Anarchism directly from Anarchists, instead of from anti-Anarchist accounts and from their own imagination of what it must be like. Recommend Liberty. Be brief.

Section B.—U. Tanner, Cannon Falls, Minn., much interested in proportional representation and in giving "every one his fair share of land," writes in the Minneapolis "Times" of April 6, in part, as follows:

> This is for Taxpayer who wrote in last Monday's edition: he is truly in a pitiable environment; like thousands of others in the same predicament, he knows not which way to turn; he lives in the court of King Majority, where forty-nine must submit to the will of fifty-one rogues and fools. He might evolute out by the process of proportional representation; or he might move on to five acres of land (I would not advise much less than that) and grub his living out of the soil. He need not be deterred by that junta of seventy-eight farmers of Ottertail county, who were so agreeably entertained by the State agricultural school. By the way, what is the reason we cannot get our scientific farmers to settle the fact of how much land will support a family? It seems to me that the State might experiment for the small farmer as well as for the large farmer. Is it well for the individual to wait for the decision of the State in matters of personal judgment? Now, admitting that five acres of land is amply sufficient to support a family, let us say that each one of these seventy-eight farmers has one hundred acres of land; this would be enough to make homes for 2,496 families,—quite a hole among the starving population

of Minneapolis. But, when we reflect that the common farmer is growling because of his scanty profits, and is asking for special legislation, we must come to the conclusion that fools and rogues are very plenty in our population somewhere. Taking the broad proposition that interest, rent, and taxes are burdens imposed by the rogues upon the fools will help us considerably in discriminating these two classes; but then we are in the court of King Majority, and are not allowed to follow our individual judgment. Let us at least improve our opportunity for free expression in the "Times."

Show how we can escape the rule of the majority more thoroughly than by proportional representation, and how this will stop the imposing of these "burdens on the fools", recommend our literature.

STEPHEN T. BYINGTON.

WANTED, work for the summer, the coming school year, or both, as teacher, librarian, translator, writer, or anything else for which I am competent. I have a thorough knowledge of Greek, Latin, French, and German, a creditable knowledge of Spanish, and enough Italian, Danish, Hebrew, Arabic, and Syriac to be of practical use, besides a smattering of some other languages. I speak no language fluently, but have a correct pronunciation. Other specialties, mathematics and political science. I can show testimonials of scholarship above the average, not only in my specialties, but in nearly all ordinary branches of college study. I have had two and a half years' experience as a teacher, in which I have found that I can do well when I have a boy by himself, but cannot keep large classes in order, unless they are willing to be orderly. My present employer says that he is satisfied with my work. I can begin work under a new engagement at any time after June 15. STEPHEN T. BYINGTON, Flushing Institute, Flushing, N. Y.

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